In re Wimbs by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation









[Crim. No. 10239. In Bank. Dee. 16, 1966.] 
In re JAMES WIMBS on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Habeas Corpus-Evidence-Improper Plea of Guilt,..-In a 
proceeding in habeas corpus, averments as to involuntary 
guilty pleas to charges of feloniously issuing checks without 
sufficient funds in two counties did not raise a triable issue 
of fact where it appeared from the court records that defend-
ant entered a guilty plea in one county to issuing nine checks 
totaling over $100 on the same day he was so charged, that 
the court and public defender, at the time defendant was 
granted probation, were not aware that he might be taken 
to a second county for prosecution on other bad check charges, 
that he was arraigned in the second county and volunteered 
information as to his offenses, that he told the court he had 
"told the whole thing" because he wanted to make restitution, 
and, at the hearing for probation and sentence, he indicated 
his inability to make restitution. 
[2] Id.-Grounds for Relief-Judgment.-Habeas corpus is avail-
able to attack a judgment pronounced in violation of defend-
ant's rights to appear and defend in person and with counsel 
(Const., art. I, § 13). 
[3] Criminal Law-Judgment-Amendment.-Where, after order .. 
ing that the sentence imposed on defendant should run con .. 
secutively with any other he might be serving, ~he court 
directed entry of a "corrected" judgment for its sentence to 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Judgments, § 401; Am. Jur.2d, Criminal 
Law, § 569. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 62.1(6); [2] 
Habeas Corpus, § 34(1) (a); [3] Criminal Law, § 1034. 
previously imposed to be placed into effect, the defendant has the right 
to a separate appeal from the latter order as one "made after judgment, 
affecting [his] substantial rights" (Pen. Code, § 1231, subd. 3), provided 
that appeal is directed only to matters occurring in the post-judgment 
commitment proceedings and does not raise issues which could have been 
reviewed on a timely appeal from the suspended judgment itself. 
·Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assip. 
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
') 
) 
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run concurrently, the purported "correction" was not of a 
merely clerical error or inadvertence but an attempt, in excess 
of the court's power, to revise its deliberately exercised 
judicial discretion. The court was without power to thus 
"correct" its sentence as pronounced and formally entered 
in the minutes. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Order of superior court of one county purporting 
to make its sentence run concurrently with the previously 
imposed sentence of another county set aside with directions; 
order to show cause discharged; writ denied. 
James Wimbs, in pro. per., and Robert N. Beechinor, under 
appointment by the Supreme Court, for Petiti~ner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, 
Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Derald E. Granberg, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner is serving sentences based 
on his pleas of guilty to three charges of feloniously issuing 
checks without sufficient' funds. (Pen. Code, § 476a.) He 
fraudulently issued nine checks for amounts totailingmore 
than $100 in San Joaquin County in 1964 and two checks, 
each for more than $100, in Stanislaus County in 1965. In 
January 1966 he was arrested in Los Angeles County and 
confessed to the offenses. In February 1966 he pleaded guilty 
to the 1964 offense in the San Joaquin County Superior 
Court, and that court suspended imposition of sentence and 
granted him probation. In March 1966, on petitioner's plea 
of guilty to the 1965 offenses, the Stanislaus County Superior 
Court imposed concurrent sentences to the state prison. On 
May 23, while petitioner was in the state prison under the 
Stanislaus County sentences, the San Joaquin County Su-
perior Court revoked probation and sentenced petitioner to 
the state prison for the 1964 offense. 
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds 
that his guilty pleas were induced by misrepresentations, 
threats, and promises precluding his exercise of free will and 
judgment, and that the San Joaquin County Superior Court 
imposed sentence in his absence and in violation of his right 
to appear and defend in person and with counsel. 
Habeas corpus proceedings have been invoked. to explore 
contentions, similar to those of petitioner here, that a guilty 
) 
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pica was vitiated by the continuing coercive effect of an 
illegally obtained cxtrajudicial confession (In re Poe (1966) 
ante, p. 25 [51 Cal.Rptr. 896, 415 P.2d 784] ; In re Seiterle 
(1964) 61 Cal.2d 651, 657 [39 Cal.Rptr. 716]), by misrepresen-
tation and inadequacy of the public defender (In re Poe, 
supra, ante, at pp. 32-35; In re Beaty (1966) 64 Cal.2d 760, 
7G4 [51 Cal.Rptr. 521, 414 P.2d 817] ; In re Atchley (1957) 
48 Cal.2d 408, 412-413 [310 P.2d 15]; In re Hough (1944) 
24 Cal.2d 522 [150 P.2d 448]), and by threats and promises 
as to punishment made by defense counsel and reiterated or 
corroborated by the prosecuting attorney or the court (In 
re Atchley, supra, 48 Cal.2d at pp. 410, 414; In re Hough, 
supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 527). 
In petitioner's account of events leading to his pleas arid 
sentences he charges the San Joaquin County public defender, 
district attorney, and judge of the superior court with mis-
representing that confessions obtained from him in violation 
of People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338, 353 [42 Cal. Rptr. 
lG9, 398 P.2d 361], were proper evidence against petitioner, 
and with threatening consecutive prison sentences if peti-
tioner did not plead guilty and promising probation if hc 
did. He charges similar misrepresentations, threats, and 
promises by the Stanislaus County public defender and 
district attorney. [1] Petitioner's version of events, sum-
marized in the margin, l does not take into account the facts 
1 Petitioner asserts that the following events led him to become "the 
deluded instrument of his own conviction": He was arrested in Glendale 
on January 28, 1966, pursuant to a warrant issued in Downey on a 
forgery complaint. When he asked to telephone for bail and an attorney, 
the arresting officer slapped him and toid him the Downey police would 
let him telephone after he had made a statement. Neither the Glendale 
police nor the other law enforcement officers through whose hands peti-
tioner later passed informed him of his rights to counsel and to remain 
silent under People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Cal.2d 338, 353 [42 Cal.Rptr. 
109, 398 P.2d 361]. Because petitioner had been slapped when he first 
nsked to telephone an attorney, petitioner did not renew that request. The 
Glendale police interrogated him for four hours, then turned him over to 
the Downey police, who held him incommunicado for two days, questioned 
him, and obtained his confession to the subject crimes. The Downey 
charge was dropped on January 31 and on February 4 the Downey police 
turned petitioner and his confession over to the Stockton police. The 
Stockton officers took petitioner to San Joaquin County, held him in· 
communicado for three days, "confronted" him with his earlier tape· 
recorded confession made in Downey, interrogated him, and obtained 
another confession to the subject crimes. 
On February 26, 1966, petitioller appeared ill the San Joaquin County 
Superior Court. There the public defender, the district attorney, and the 
judge told him that bis confessions were evidence that could be used 
against him, threatened him with consecutive prison sentences if he did 
not plead guilty, and promised that if he pleaded guilty he would receive 
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of record in the proceedings against him. The court records 
not only show that the proceedings were regular on their face 
but also refute the bases of petitioner's factual conclusion 
that his pleas were the product of official misrepresentations, 
threats, and promises .. 
Thus, petitioner asserts that on February 26 he appeared 
in the -San Joaquin County Superior Court and pleaded 
guilty to six counts of violating section 476a after court and 
counsel had ".confronted" him with his illegally obtained 
confessions and made the claimed threats and promises. 
Petitioner's assertions are confuted by the record showing 
that on February 14 the district attorney filed the informa-
tion charging one count of violating section 476a by issuance 
of nine checks totalling $102.72 and on the same day peti-
tioner personally stated, in response to questioning by the 
court, that he was familiar with the allegations of the infor-
mation and entered his guilty plea. The record further shows 
·that on February 28, -when petitioner was granted probation, 
the court and the public defender were not aware that 
probation. Petitioner incorrectly states tllat on February 26 he pleaded 
guilty to six counts of issuing checks without sufficient funds. Thereafter 
the San Joaquin County Superior Court granted probation on condition 
that petitioner make restitution. 
On March 2, 1966, petitioner and his confessions were turned over to 
law enforcement officers of Stanislaus County. They took him to Modesto 
and repeated the process of holding him incommunicado for three days, 
"confronting" him with his previous confessions, questioning him in 
violation of Dorado, and obtaining another confession. The public de-
fender and district attorney of Stanislaus County then induced petitioner 
to plead guilty by misrepresenting that the confessions could be used in 
evidence against him and by threats and false promises as to punishment. 
The Stanislaus County Superior Court considered granting probation but 
did not do so because petitioner was unable to make restitution. 
On March 28, immediately after the Stanislaus County Superior Court 
sentenced petitioner to concurrent terms in the state prison for his 1965 
offenses, petitioner sent a letter from the Modesto jail to the superior 
court judge before whom he had appeared in San Joaquin County, with 
a copy to the San Joaquin County district attorney, stating, "You lied 
to me. They didn't give me probation like you promised. . . . They told 
me if I made restitution they would grant probation but I aill't got no 
money and they said I had to go to prison. 
"Are you going to continue me on probation' If you aren't then I 
want to come to court because you people have done me wrong and I 
want a lawyer." 
On April 29, 1966, the San Joaquin County public defender wrote to 
petitioner in the state prison advising that he was no longer eligible for 
probation because of the prison sentence imposed in Stanislaus County 
and requesting that petitioner allow the public defender to appear in 
petitioner's absence for pronouncemcnt of sentence in San Joaquin County. 
Thereafter, petitioner asserts, the San Joaquin County Superior Court 
sentenced him in his absence in violation of his right "to appear and 
defend, in person and with coullsel." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) 
) 
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petitioner was liable to be taken to Stanislaus County for 
prosecution there.2 Manifestly then petitioner is mistaken 
in his assertion that his guilty plea was induced by statements 
of the San Joaquin County Superior Court that led him to 
believe he would receive probation in Stanislaus County. 
Petitioner avers that on March 2 Stanislaus County author-
ities took him from San Joaquin County to Modesto and then 
held him incommunicado for three days while unlawfully 
eliciting another confession. This averment is disproved by 
the record of the municipal court in Modesto showing that 
petitioner was arraigned there on the Stanislaus County 
complaint on March 3 at 9 :30 a.m. 
At the proceedings in Stanislaus County,S both in the 
2The probation report considered by the San Joaquin County Superior 
Court on ]february 28 does not mention the charges in Stanislaus County. 
It states that petitioner had admitted to the probation officer the truth 
of the facts charged in the San Joaquin County information and recom-
mends the granting of probation because of petitioner's "minimal prior 
criminal record" (a minor traffie violation in California and a minor 
game law violation in Oregon), his expressed remorse, and the fact that 
apparently he would benefit from the supervision available on probation. 
The judge commented that "defendant has a good reeord" and the 
public defender replied that he did and joined in the recommendation 
that he be granted probation. 
The terms of probation make it obvious that the court contemplated--
that petitioner, who was then without funds, would be released on proba-
tion so that he could obtain employment and make restitution as ordered, 
not that he would be turned over to authorities of another county for 
further prosecution. The probation order concluded, "The defendant will 
be released after he has signed a copy of the terms of probation." 
On March 1 petitioner signed a certificate that he had received and 
familiarized himself with a copy of the probation order. On March 2 the 
probation officer filed a supplemental report stating that he had in-
advertently failed to state in his previous report that while petitioner was 
in jail awaiting disposition of the San Joaquin County charge, warrants 
were filed against him on charges of two violations of section 476a in 
Stanislaus County and charges of violations of the same section in 
Tehama County and Sacramento County. Petitioner was then turned over 
to the Stanislaus County authorities. 
On May 23 when the San Joaquin County Superior Court revoked 
probation and imposed sentence the judge stated that he had not known 
of the pending charges in other counties at the time probation was 
granted and had first learned of them on Mareh 2. 
SOn March 3, 1966, petitioner appeared in the municipal court in 
Modesto, was informed of the complaint charging two violations of seetion 
476a in Stanislaus County, and was advised of his rights. The proeeeding 
continued as follows: 
"THE COURT: ... Do you want to be represented by a lawyer' 
, , DEFENDANT: Your Honor, under interrogation I did admit to the 
checks. 
, 'THE COURT: Do you want to have a lawyer or not' 
" DEi'ENDANT: Well, do you have my record there from Stoekton' 
, , THE COURT : No, sir. 
"DEFENDANT: Well, I was placed on probation. 
"THE COURT: Just a moment. I don't know anything at all about that. 
) 
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municipal court and in the superior court, petitioner volun-
teered information as to his offenses in other counties. He told 
the superior court, "\Vhen I surrendered I told the whole 
All I know is that there will be a preliminary examination on this ease, 
unless you are represented by counsel and enter a plea of guilty or you 
waive the preliminary examination. • • • [Y) ou cannot do either of those 
without being represented by a lawyer .•.. 
"DEFENDANT: Well, then I would like to have an attorney ..•• 
, 'THE OOURT: All right; the public defender is appointed." 
On the afternoon of March 3 petitioner appeared in municipal court 
with the public defender, pleaded guilty, and the matter was certified to 
the superior court. 
On March 10 petitioner appeared in the superior court. The court 
reviewed the proceedings had in the municipal court and asked, "You 
pleaded guilty to these two counts because you are guilty of those two 
offenses' ' I Petitioner answered, "Yes." The court stated, "Defendant 
stands convicted of a violation of Section 476a ••• in two counts, both 
felonies, II advised petitioner of his right to counsel, and asked, "you 
want an attorney' 
"THE DEFENDANT: May I ask, is it possible that I can save the County 
money, because I have pleaded guilty, and I have received probation in 
another county for the same thing. • • • 
"THE COURT: What county, 
, 'THE DEFENDANT: San Joaquin. 
"THE COURT: And when did you receive probation there' ••• 
"THE DEFENDANT: 28th of February. 
"THE COURT: 1966' 
, , THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
, 'THE COURT: Now these checks, according to the complaint, were 
written by you [in Stanislaus County] on the 28th of December, 1965. 
, 'THE DEFENDANT : Yes. 
"THE COURT: • • . I will want this matter referred to the Probation 
.officer. Have you ever been in State Prison' 
, 'THE DEFENDANT : No, I haven't. I also have two holds on me, one in 
Sacramento and one in Tehama. 
, 'THE COURT: Are these cheeks also t 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes. When I surrendered I told the whole thing, 
because I do want to make restitution. 
, 'THE COURT: I will come back to it. • • • If you want the Public 
Defender I will appoint him to represent you. If you don't, then of 
course I won't make the appointment. 
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I would, Your Honor. 
, 'THE COURT: Y ou will be appointed then, Mr. Stone, as the Public 
Defender to represent the Defendant at all stages of the proceedings. I 
assume that you want this matter referred to the Probation Officer for 
investigation and report. 
"MR. STONE: Yes, Your Honor. 
The court fixed March 29 as the time for hearing on probation and 
sentence. On that day petitioner appeared with Mr. Stone. The court 
stated, "[T]he Probation Officer recommends against probation in this 
matter, by reason of the fact that the Defendant has outstanding cheeks 
in numerous counties and as a matter of fact in Oregon ...• 
"MR. STONE: I have discussed the matter with the Defendant. He ad-
vises me that the information set forth in the report is factually correct 
[except for a few minor matters that were then corrected in open 
eourt]. . .• . 
"THE COURT: Mr. Wimbs, you've gotten yourself in a very difficult 
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thing, because I do want to make restitution." Thereafter, 
at the probation and sentellce hearing, the court stated, 
" [Y] ou have restitution to make in the event of probation 
that you will never be able to make. That's about the answer, " 
and petitioner said, "That's about the answer." Sentence 
was imposed and petitioner, having assumed in the Stanislaus 
County Superior Court an attitude of frank disclosure, then 
wrote to the San Joaquin County Superior Court the letter 
quoted in footnote 1, stating, "You lied, to me. They didn't 
give me probation like you promised." In the light of the 
objective facts of record and of petitioner's misstatements as 
to those facts, we do not believe that his averments that his 
guilty pleas were involuntary raise a triable issue of fact. 
[2] Habeas corpus is available also to attack a jUdgment 
pronounced in violation of a defendant's rights "to appear 
and defend" in person and with counsel" (CatConst., art. 
I, § 13). (In"e Perez (1966) ante, pp. 224, 230 [53 Cal. 
Rptr. 414, 418 P.2d 6].) Petitioner contends that the San 
Joaquin County Superior Court's imposition of sentence on 
May 23, 1966, while petitioner was confined in the state 
prison, violated those rights. The Legislature, however, has 
provided a procedure for pronouncement of judgment in the 
absence of a defendant to whom the court has granted pro-
bation without imposition of sentence,: who is thereafter 
. imprisoned under a commitment for another crime, and who 
executes a written request, attested by a prison official, stating 
that the defendant "wishes the court to impose sentence in 
the case in which he was released on probation, in his absence 
event of probation that you will never be able to make. That's about the 
answer. 
, 'THE DEFENDANT: That's about the answer. • • • 
, 'THE COURT: • • • I will follow the recommendation of the Proba-
tion Officer. Probation is denied. Is there any statement you wish to 
make ••• , 
"Ma. STONE: No. Your Honor. We will waive formal arraignment for 
judgment. and there is no legal cause to show why the judgment and 
sentence of the Court should not now be pronounced. 
"THE COURT: • • • Is there any statement that you wish to mnke, Mr. 
Wimbs' 
, 'THE DEFENDANT: Does this here [the possibility of· charges from 
other jurisdictions being pressed after delivery to the state prison] ••• 
include out of State also' 
"THE COURT: That I don't know. • • • I suggest after you get to 
Vacaville you might talk to some of the nuthorities up there and make a 
determination there whnt course you are to assullle." 
After pronouncing judgment of conviction on the two counts the court 
stated. "Now you are going to have a lot of other things to face before 
you are through. I am going to order these two counts to run con-
currently. " 
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and without his being represented by counseL" (Pen. Code, 
§ 1203.28.)4 The San Joaquin County sentence of May 23 
was imposed in compliance with section 1203.2a. I» 
4Section 1203.23., as amended in 1963, provides in this regard: tt If 
any defendant who has been released on probation is committed to a 
prison in this State for another offense, the court which released him 
on probation shall have jurisdiction to impose sentence, if no sentence 
has previously been imposed for the offense for which he was granted 
probation, in the absence of the defendant, on the request of the defend-
ant made through his counsel, or by himself in writing, if such writing is 
signed in the presence of the warden or superintendent of the prison in 
which he is confined or the duly authorized representative of the warden 
or superintendent, and such warden or superintendent or his representa-
tive attests both that the defendant has made and signed such request and 
that he states that he wishes the court to impose sentence in the ease in 
which he WM released on probation, in his absence and without his being 
represented by counsel. 
H The probation officer may, upon learning of such defendant's im-
prisonment, and must within 30 days after being notified in writing by 
the defendant or his counsel, or the warden or superintendent. " , report 
such commitment to the court which released him on probation. 
" ••. If sentence has not been previously imposed and if the defendant 
has requested the court through counselor in writing in the manner 
herein provided to impose sentence in the case in which he was released 
on probation in his absence and without the presence of counsel to repre-
sent him, the court shall impose sentence and issue its commitment, or 
shall make other final order terminating its jurisdiction over the defend-
ant in the case in which the order of probation was made .... If the ease 
is one in which sentence has not previously been imposed, the court is 
deprived of jurisdiction over defendant if it does not impose sentence 
and issue its commitment or make other final order terminating its 
jurisdiction over defendant in the CMe within 30 days after defendant 
has. in the manner prescribed by this section. requested imposition of 
sentence. 
, , .•• In the event the probation officer fails to report such commitment 
to the court or the court fails to impose sentence as herein provided, the 
court shall be deprived thereafter of all jurisdiction it may have retained 
in the granting of probation in said case." 
GAs stated above, immediately after the Stanislaus County Superior 
Court sentenced petitioner to the state prison he wrote to the San 
Joaquin County Superior Court. "Are you going to continue me on 
probation' If you aren't then I want to come to court because you 
people have done me wrong and I want a lawyer." 
After petitioner was delivered to the state prison the San Joaquin 
County Public Defender wrote to him on April 29, 1966, stating that 
"Since you are not now eligible for probation and your matter will be 
brought before the Court here. it is requested that you allow this office 
to appear without your presence for the purpose of having sentence 
pronounced in this County. We are in hopes that upon the termination of 
probation, the Court will sentence you to the State Prison to run con-
currently with the sentence you are now serving." 
On May 5, 1966, petitioner signed and the prison records officer attested 
a request, directed to the San Joaquin County probation officer. stating, 
"In accordance with Section 1203.2a of the Penal Code. I am requesting 
that you advise the Superior Court of your county with respect to my 
present commitment and that you request said court to effect disposition 
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[3] When the San Joaquin County Superior Court im-
posed sentence on May 23, it ordered that its sentence run 
consecutively with any other sentence petitioner might be 
serving. Thereafter on JUly 13, 1966, that court directed 
entry of a "corrected" judgment ordering that its sentence 
run concurrently. The court was without power to thus 
"correct" its sentence as pronounced and formally entered 
in the minutes. (In re Pedrini (1949) 33 Cal.2d 876, 879 
[206 P.2d 699] ; People v. Behrmann (1949) 34 Ca1.2d 459, 
462 [211 P.2d 575] ; People v. Thomas (1959) 52 Ca1.2d 521 
[342 P.2d 889].) As the Attorney General points out, the 
purported "correction" was not of merely clerical error or 
inadvertence but an attempt, in excess of the court's power, 
to revise its deliberately exercised judicial discretion.6 (See 
also In re Sandel (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 412 [50 Cal.Rptr. 462, 
412 P.2d 806].) 
Petitioner, however, contends that the San Joaquin County 
~uperior Court was without power to make its initial order 
of May 23, 1966, that its sentence should run consecutively. 
This argument, presented in propria persona, rests on 
petitioner's misunderstanding of In re Nate (1965) 237 
Cal.App.2d 809, 812 [47 Cal.Rptr. 457], and In re Roberts 
(1953) 40Cal.2d 745, 749 [255 P.2d 782]. Neither of those 
cases holds or suggests, as petitioner argues, that a court that 
has withheld imposition of sentence and granted probation 
is without power thereafter to make its sentence consecutive 
to another sentence imposed while the defendant was on 
probation. 
noted above. I understand that I am not to appear personally or to have 
representation by eounsel." 
On May 12 the probation offieer filed with the San Joaquin County 
Superior Court a report direeting the eourt's attention to petitioner'8 
situation and his just quoted written request. On May 23 the matter of 
the revoeation of petitioner's probation and imposition of sentenee eame 
before the eourt. The publie defender appeared on petitioner's behalf 
to request that the sentence run eoncurrently. The court, however, ordered 
that the sentence run eonsecutively for the stated reason that" I see that 
this [issuance of checks without sufficient funds] is an old habit of this 
man-started out in 1964 before they caught up with him in February of 
this year and apparently prior to that time, between the time of cashing 
the cheeks in this County and the present time, he had three other 
counties after him for the same offenses." 
6Aecording to the Attorney General's points and authorities, the 
senteneing judge advises that his initial order that the sentence run 
conseeutively was based on his understanding that "petitioner's other 
offenses had occurred subsequent to the granting of probation," and 
when the judge learned that the other offenses had been committed 
before the granting of probation "he directed entry of the corrected 
judgment. " 
The order of the San Joaquin County Superior Court pur-
porting to make its sentence run concurrently with the 
previously imposed sentence of the Stanislaus County Su-
perior Court is set aside and the Adult Authority is directed 
to consider the sentence as consecutive in accordance with 
the judgment pronounced on May 23, 1966. The order to 
show cause is discharged and the petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus is denied. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Peek, J.,. concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied Febru-
ary 1, 1967. . 
